This is a wonderful article, very important timing. Ria is absolutely right on, except I suspect strongly that Petreaus is much more of an ally than she thinks. But there are other problems with the American military and political system that are preventing the rational approach that she is recommending. The ideology of killing, hard conquest, is in the way, and it still afflicts enough people at various levels of authority that moving quickly now is hard. But that is where progressives need to step up and lobby hard, with money, to do the right thing.
© Marc Gopin
A role for the US in Afghan national reconciliation?
05 August 2010
Washington, DC – In June, at the latest loya jirga (a grand assembly comprised of tribal leaders) meeting in Kabul, 1,600 local Afghan leaders endorsed a social reintegration programme for low-level Taliban insurgents willing to renounce violence, accept the Afghan Constitution and return to their homes with potential incentives, such as employment, vocational training or development projects for their communities.
The jirga was a significant step forward in consensus building and national reconciliation among Afghans. The programme is designed to attract Taliban insurgents who have no ideological commitment to the Taliban and are part of the insurgency for monetary compensation. However, reintegrating Taliban foot soldiers is only one dimension of a broader reconciliation process.
Although the United States supports and funds reintegration of foot soldiers, it still refuses to endorse talks with senior Taliban leadership, in essence creating a major roadblock towards Afghan-led reconciliation efforts. This strategy continues despite the fact that the majority of NATO allies, and senior Afghan and US officials, have publicly acknowledged that this war cannot be won by military means alone. If Afghanistan is to move towards lasting peace, the United States’ overall strategy must be changed.
The United States and the Taliban leadership continue to place opposing preconditions on the Kabul government which prevent a national reconciliation process from going forward. For example, the United States wants the Taliban to stop fighting and accept the Afghan Constitution. The Taliban, meanwhile, wants foreign forces out of Afghanistan as a precondition to joining the government’s political process. Furthermore, senior Taliban leadership is open to dialogue with the United States, but only under the condition that there are no other preconditions for holding talks.
To break this stalemate, build trust between both sides and facilitate reconciliation, Karzai’s administration has pushed the United Nations in recent months to remove certain Taliban commanders from its terror list. And Kabul and Islamabad are rumoured to be luring top Taliban leadership into Afghanistan’s political process. However, US Army General David Petraeus’s recent decision to blacklist the Haqqani Network – an insurgency group in Afghanistan and Pakistan closely allied with the Taliban – as a terrorist organisation may jeopardise these initiatives.
US President Barack Obama has declared that his country’s objective in Afghanistan is to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda” while breaking the “momentum” of the Taliban. The counter-insurgency strategy pursued by the United States seeks to weaken the Taliban insurgency before endorsing formal dialogue between the Karzai Administration and insurgent commanders. The strategy to meet this goal needs to be reassessed.
First, there are only 50 to 100 active Al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan, according to Afghan and US officials, which means that a huge military force to deal with this number of operatives is wholly disproportionate. Second, the only way to break the “momentum” of the Taliban lies in assisting an Afghan-centric reconciliation process, which heavily supports talks with senior Taliban commanders.
After all, there have been nine years of fighting an insurgency without serious engagement in dialogue to bring these elements into the political fold – and the Taliban have only become stronger, not weaker. Thus, the stability of Afghanistan rests on re-examining the ineffectiveness of a hard power approach and an eventual transition towards the robust use of soft power in meeting long-term policy objectives. The best way to help the Kabul government stabilise the country is to support their full reconciliation strategy, which includes reaching out to senior Taliban commanders.
Third, all major players – including the governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States, and NATO allies, amongst others – need to put an emphasis on socio-economic development, reconstruction, institution building, education and human rights in Afghanistan.
Finally, the exploitation of ethnic divisions for political interests by regional players and internal actors must be contained by the United States. Both Afghan majority and minority leaders must work together to bring peace to their war-torn nation.
Continued violence and long-term military engagement will only lead to further destruction of Afghan society. Supporting Afghan efforts to reconcile differences among themselves and strengthening Afghan state institutions will pave the way for long-term stability. Neither the Afghans nor the international community can allow Afghanistan to become a safer haven for terrorists.
* Shukria Dellawar (email@example.com) is an independent analyst based in the Washington, DC area. This article was written for the Common Ground News Service (CGNews).
Source: Common Ground News Service (CGNews), 3 August 2010, www.commongroundnews.org
Copyright permission is granted for publication.